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1 Introduction
Since its inception in 1947, the GATT has evolved into a comprehensive framework of international
trade laws as it exists today under the WTO. The operation of the GATT/WTO system has, to
a large extent, hinged on the effectiveness of its dispute settlement mechanism. This procedure
allows member countries to challenge other member countries’ questionable trade measures with
reference to the GATT/WTO agreements, and hence serves as a mutual surveillance and enforce-
ment mechanism. Beginning with meager treaty clauses, the dispute procedure was elaborated
increasingly during the GATT years, but it was the adoption of the WTO dispute procedure in
1995 that fundamentally changed the nature of dispute settlement.
The customary practice under the GATT of requiring all decisions to be made by consensus
posed a structural problem for the GATT dispute procedure. The defending party, by raising
objection to consensus, could delay or block the procedure from moving forward, the most serious
problem being the potential of the defending country to block an adverse ruling. The WTO
dispute procedure established in 1995 altered several aspects of the GATT mechanism. The most
significant was the removal of the consensus rule for adoption of rulings and hence the elimination of
the blocking problem. A ruling made by a panel of experts will be deemed automatically adopted.
To guard against possible legal errors made by the panel, an appellate procedure was added. A
panel ruling can be appealed by either one of the disputing parties. If appealed, the dispute will
proceed to an appellate panel, whose judgment will be final and likewise adopted automatically
unless there is a consensus against adoption.
Power politics, inherent in international relations, poses another threat to the efficient use of the
GATT dispute settlement mechanism. Considerations of potential diplomatic cost (be it political,
economic, or military) influence countries’ decisions of whether to initiate the formal procedure for
resolving trade disputes. During the dispute settlement process, power politics might also affect
countries’ ability to extract bilateral settlements and to carry on the litigation. To what extent
power politics have intervened in the GATT legal system depends on the international support
for using the dispute procedure to resolve trade conflicts. The data on dispute cases under the
GATT regime during the 1950s–1980s showed a varied pattern in the number of filed complaints
and their procedural outcomes across different decades. The pattern in the data corresponds to
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some interesting evolutions and movements in these decades, as to be documented later, which
conceivably have affected countries’ political considerations of using the GATT dispute procedure.
Although not immune from the influence of power politics, the WTO procedure, given its more
automatic and rule-based structure, leaves less room for power play. The procedure has since
established itself as the norm for resolving trade conflicts in the international community. This is
reflected in the dramatic increase of filed complaints under the WTO procedure.
Most studies on the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism have been conducted by schol-
ars of law and political science.1 Bu¨tler and Hauser (2000) was the first theoretical paper that
systematically investigated this mechanism from an economic perspective.2 They, however, focused
on the WTO dispute procedure; the incentives and interactions of countries in using the GATT dis-
pute procedure were left largely unaccounted for. Furthermore, their theoretical model maintained
a complete information framework and thus excluded the possibility of “withdrawn or abandoned”
cases. We observe, however, non-negligible amounts of such cases during both the GATT and WTO
eras.
In a related literature on civil litigation, P’ng (1983), Nalebuff (1987), and Bebchuk (1988)
present some potential frameworks toward understanding withdrawn civil disputes. In these papers,
negative-expected-value suits can be filed with the presence of one-sided asymmetric information,
and as a result, these suits are withdrawn or dropped if a settlement fails. Upon closer inspection,
however, these papers are not so satisfactory in explaining withdrawn suits, because the withdrawal
outcome in these papers either does not arise in the equilibrium or arise in the equilibrium only if it
is costless for the plaintiff to file and then to withdraw a suit. In practice, countries typically have to
incur (pecuniary or nonpecuniary) costs by bringing a dispute under the GATT/WTO procedure.
Thus, the one-sided asymmetric information models discussed above can not predict withdrawn
cases and fully account for the interactions of disputing parties in international litigations.
In this paper, I propose a theoretical framework of dispute settlement to explain the incidence
of complaints filed and their disposition (withdrawn, settled, ruled – blocked or appealed) under
the GATT/WTO procedures. I adopt a two-sided asymmetric information framework which allows
1See, for example, Hudec (1993, 1999) and Jackson (1997, 2000) for analysis from the legal perspective, and Busch
(2000) for investigations from the political-science perspective.
2See Horn et al. (1999) for an empirical study of the WTO dispute settlement system. See also Bown (2002a,b)
for studies of the GATT/WTO dispute mechanism versus the safeguards provisions.
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for potential litigation (political) cost, and explore the effects of political power on countries’
incentives to use, and their interactions in using, the dispute settlement mechanism. The model’s
results indicate that as the political cost (relative to potential benefit) of using this mechanism
to resolve trade conflicts increases for the complaining country, the dispute procedure is initiated
less frequently, whereas the incidence of cases withdrawn or abandoned increases at first before
decreases toward zero.
This paper then investigates the role of the degree of legal controversy over a panel ruling in
determining countries’ incentives to block or appeal a panel report. It is shown that under both
the GATT and WTO procedures, there exists asymmetric disadvantage against the complainant.
The potential benefit for the complainant to block or appeal an adverse panel ruling is uniformly
less than the defendant, while the potential cost for both to do so is the same. This disadvantage
to the complainant is diminished under the WTO procedure compared to the GATT, but is not
totally eliminated. It is also shown that as the level of legal controversy over panel rulings increases
overall, GATT panel reports are blocked at a higher frequency. The propensity to block a panel
report under the GATT, however, is generally lower than to appeal a panel report under the WTO.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a more detailed account of the
evolution of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Section 3 sets up the theoretical
structure of the dispute mechanism, including the payoff and uncertainty structure. In Section 4,
the theoretical model is developed and applied to explain the stylized facts that we observe in the
data. Concluding remarks are collected in Section 5.
2 Evolution of the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism
When the attempt to create an international trade organization in the late 1940s failed, the success-
fully negotiated trade agreement, the GATT, was left without a well-defined institutional structure.3
Only a few clauses with regard to dispute settlement were contained in the original GATT, most
of which centered around Article XXIII. The article states that a member country may request
consultation with another member country, should it consider that its benefit expected under the
GATT is being nullified or impaired by the other member country’s trade measure. If no settlement
3For more details, see Jackson (2000, p. 119).
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is reached between the parties, the matter may be referred to the “Contracting Parties” (the mem-
ber countries), which shall investigate and recommend action or give a ruling on the matter. In
appropriately serious cases, the Contracting Parties may also authorize retaliatory actions. Despite
the skeletal framework of Article XXIII, the dispute settlement in the early years of GATT worked
rather smoothly, thanks to its small and homogeneous membership. Disputes were resolved in
plenary meetings by rulings from the chair or consensus votes of member countries. As the proce-
dure evolved, it began to delegate members’ complaints to “working parties,” formed by interested
governments. One remarkable development occurred in 1952 when the GATT started using “the
panel on complaints.”4 A panel composed of neutral government delegates would be established
to hear and rule on a dispute. They would act in their own capacities and independently of any
government interests. This development marked the beginning of third-party adjudication of legal
claims brought under the GATT.
Because only the Contracting Parties had the power to decide on a matter, a panel report had
to be adopted or approved by the Contracting Parties before its rulings became binding. Because it
was a customary practice of GATT to require all decisions to be made by consensus, the procedure
was inherently subject to delaying or blocking by the defending party, which by raising objection
to consensus could keep the panel procedure from moving forward: the creation of the panel, the
selection of the panelists, the adoption of the panel report, the authorization of retaliation. However,
this delaying or blocking problem did not begin to surface until in the 1970s, the notorious example
being the DISC case brought by the EC against the US, and three US counter-claims.5
During the Tokyo Round negotiations conducted in 1973–1979, the GATT dispute settlement
mechanism developed on dual tracks. On one hand, the negotiating efforts to strengthen the general
dispute procedure of Article XXIII did not go very far. The resulting document “Understanding”6
codified the established practices in implementing the procedure, but it was still ambiguous about
whether the complainant had an absolute right to a panel process, and it did not take away the veto
power of disputing parties in panel adoption. On the other hand, many of the new “MTN Codes,”
resulting from negotiation efforts to restrain nontariff trade measures, also created their own dispute
procedures. They varied in the degree of rigor and automaticity, but generally appeared to grant the
4Hudec (1993), p. 30.
5See Hudec (1993), Complaint 69, 70, 71, 72.
6“Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance.”
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complainant an automatic right to panel procedures. In this respect, the dispute procedures under
these Codes were stronger than the GATT general procedure. The consensus rule, nevertheless,
was still upheld for panel adoption in these various Code procedures.7
In 1995, the WTO was established following the completion of the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions. The new Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) procedure under the WTO significantly
renovated several aspects of the GATT mechanism. No longer are the separate procedures under
the Tokyo Round Codes valid. The DSU governs all parts of the GATT/WTO system and serves
as the single, unified mechanism for dispute settlement. Furthermore, the blocking problem that
had plagued the GATT procedure is completely eliminated. A complaining country is granted an
automatic right to have a panel created. Thus blocking is prevented at this early stage. Most
importantly, a panel report is deemed automatically adopted by the new Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB). Nevertheless, an appellate procedure is added as a safeguard against possible legal errors
made by the panel. Either one of the disputing parties may consider appealing against the panel re-
port to the Appellate Body (AB), whose judgment will be final and likewise adopted automatically
unless there is a consensus against adoption. Thus, blocking a panel report has become virtually
impossible under the WTO procedure.8
3 Theoretical Setup
The GATT and WTO dispute settlement procedures can be represented by the game trees in
Figure 1. Suppose a trade dispute arises. The complaining country (C) detects that a trade-related
practice implemented by the defending country (D) might be in violation of the GATT/WTO
agreement or constitute “nullification or impairment” of benefits C expected under the agreement.
C can consider whether or not to invoke the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedure. If C
decides not to file the case (nf ), nothing happens and the status quo welfare remains, which is
normalized to be zeros.
If C decides to file the case (f ), it incurs (pecuniary or nonpecuniary) cost and benefit. The
potential costs of bringing a complaint under the GATT/WTO include international political costs
that result from an aggravated international relationship with the defending country. For example,
7Hudec (1993), pp. 53–57.
8Jackson (2000), pp. 177–178.
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the cost can be a loss of existing financial aid or preferential treatment provided by the defending
country, or damage to the prospect of mutual cooperation between the countries in commerce or
in politics. On the other hand, a government usually brings a case under the GATT/WTO in
response to a demand from a domestic industry or lobby group. By complying with their requests,
the government earns political support from these industries or lobbies, which can mean more
political contributions or more electorate votes in the future. These potential international political
costs and domestic political benefits vary with country pairs, industries involved, and international
support for the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedure. Let Kf represent the political cost
incurred by C in every period, net of domestic political benefit, by filing a complaint against D
under the GATT/WTO. It is assumed that C incurs Kf in every period once it files the dispute,
unless the dispute is settled or withdrawn, in which case Kf is incurred only for the period in which
the dispute is present under the procedure.9
In practice, C invokes the GATT/WTO dispute procedure by requesting consultation with the
defending country D. This is indicated by the beginning of Stage 0. The ensuing negotiations
between the parties may take various forms. Here the negotiation process is modeled as follows.
Faced with a complaint, D decides whether to settle with C or not. If D chooses to settle, C then
decides whether or not to accept D’s proposed settlement terms. On the other hand, if D refuses
to settle, C then decides whether to continue or withdraw from the litigation process. In reality,
settlements in trade negotiations specify changes in policies or practices of D. It is assumed that
the effects of such changes can be measured and summarized in monetary terms, the magnitude
of which is denoted S. A positive settlement amount (S > 0) means D is willing to settle, and S
represents a transfer of welfare from D to C as promised by the changes in D’s policies.10 Any zero
or negative settlement offer by D is equivalent to D’s refusal to settle.
If the dispute is neither settled nor withdrawn, it proceeds to the panel stage (Stage 1). When
a case is brought before the panel, the disputing parties face two kinds of uncertainties: the
uncertainty regarding the possible panel ruling (violation or no violation) and the uncertainty
regarding the quality of the ruling (the degree of legal controversy over the ruling). It is assumed
9In other words, it is assumed that the damage or benefit is permanent once the case is filed, but may be terminated
before the dispute is escalated to the panel stage.
10It is recognized that most trade measure changes exhibit non-zero sum natures. Zero sum is assumed here to
simplify the analysis. This simplification also applies to the implementation phase of the dispute procedure discussed
later.
7
that countries hold different interpretations about the GATT/WTO law and hence have different
subjective predictions about possible panel rulings. This is represented by pic and pid, which are
the respective probabilities that C and D predict that C’s claim will receive a positive ruling. In
other words, pic and pid are the “types” of C and D in terms of their own views of the likely panel
judgement. It is assumed that each country owns some private information which affects their
predictions about the panel ruling and therefore one country’s type is not known to the other.
They each assume that the other’s type is uniformly distributed on the closed unit interval [0, 1].
Before the panel, the parties are also uncertain about the quality of the ruling that will be
made. Depending on the trade measure in dispute and the GATT/WTO agreements invoked, a
panel ruling can be subject to different degrees of legal controversies. Let L ∈ [0, 1] represent the
degree of legal controversy that will arise over a panel ruling, and f(L|R) the probability density
function of L given a certain ruling R, where R = {0, 1} corresponds to a “no violation” and
“violation” ruling, respectively. In other words, f(L|0) is the probability that a certain degree of
legal controversy will arise over a “no violation” ruling, and f(L|1) the probability that a certain
degree of legal controversy will arise over a “violation” ruling. Intuitively, if the trade measure in
dispute is more difficult or sensitive, higher degrees of legal controversies are likely to arise over the
panel report. This is represented by a rightward shift in the probability density function f(L|R).
At the panel stage, a panel is established at C’s request to hear and rule on the matter.11
Under the GATT procedure, a panel ruling is not binding unless it is adopted by the Contracting
Parties with consensus vote. Either party may consider blocking a panel report if faced with an
adverse panel ruling. However, the diplomatic cost associated with blocking a report might prevent
a country from doing so, unless the report is indeed subject to a large degree of legal controversy.
To model this concept, I introduce the notion of blocking cost function Kb(L). For simplification,
I assume it takes the shape of a decreasing step function, as illustrated in Figure 2. This function
has the simple interpretation that if the degree of legal controversy over a panel ruling is large
enough (L > L¯), blocking the report is diplomatically permissible and therefore it incurs no cost.
Otherwise, the cost is prohibitively high. Whether C decides to block a “no violation” report or
not, no changes in D’s trade practices will follow. On the other hand, when faced with a “violation”
11I abstract from the issue that the request for a panel might be blocked by D under the GATT. In practice, it
was not as serious a problem as the blocking of a panel report, and usually a panel would eventually be established
in spite of initial blocking.
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ruling, D can potentially avoid the implementation by blocking its adoption. Otherwise, the panel
ruling will become binding and D will be obligated to begin the implementation at Stage 2.
Under the WTO procedure, the disputing parties lose their veto power over the panel report;
however, they can challenge adverse rulings by resorting to the Appellate Body. For simplification,
the cost to appeal a report (such as lawyer fees, etc.) is assumed to be negligible when compared
to the value of the disputed trade measure or the political cost at stake. The dispute ends with no
changes in D’s trade practices if C does not appeal a “no violation” ruling. On the other hand, D
is obligated to comply with the panel’s recommendation if he does not appeal a “violation” ruling.
The case proceeds to the appellate stage (Stage 2) if either party appeals. During the appellate
stage, the Appellate Body reviews the legal aspects of the panel report and makes the final ruling
on the case, which may reverse the original panel ruling in favor of the other party. I assume that
the reversal probability of a panel ruling by the Appellate Body is equal to the degree of legal
controversy L over the ruling. In other words, the higher is the degree of legal controversy over a
panel ruling, the more likely is the decision to be reversed by the Appellate Body. The appellate
review is enforceable if a “violation” ruling against D is made. The implementation is assumed to
take place beginning Stage 3.
Under the GATT or WTO procedure, if a “violation” ruling is adopted, the defending country
is obligated to remove the confirmed trade barrier. In case of non-implementation, parties can also
negotiate compensations (under the WTO). As a last resort, C can be authorized to retaliate by
withdrawing tariff concessions of value equivalent to C’s welfare loss due to D’s trade barrier.12 In
any of these outcomes, there will be a positive welfare transfer from D to C in every period. Let V
denote this equivalent value in these three possible implementation outcomes.13 Both C and D are
assumed to have a common discount factor of δ per period of time, where each stage of the process
takes one period.
12I have abstracted from the potential enforcement problem where the complainant does not or can not retaliate
after the defendant fails to comply with the panel’s recommendations. This is beyond the scope of the paper and the
extension is left for future work. However, as documented in Hudec (1993, p. 278), 90% of cases with violation rulings
were implemented in compliance with panel’s recommendations under the GATT. If we take into account that some
violation rulings were blocked, the compliance rate with “adopted” panel reports is even higher.
13See footnote 15.
9
4 Theoretical Model and Implications
The theoretical framework of dispute settlement introduced above exhibits the structure of a dy-
namic game with two-sided incomplete information. The game can be solved backward starting
from the panel stage. I first examine countries’ incentives to block (appeal) panel reports under
the GATT (WTO) regime at the panel stage, and then study their strategic interactions at the
consultation stage. The perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept is used in deriving the results.
4.1 Panel Stage
Under the GATT procedure, after the panel report is issued and its quality revealed, the disputing
parties may consider blocking an adverse ruling given its degree of legal controversy. The benefit
for D to block a “violation” ruling is to avoid changing the trade measure in dispute, which has
a continuation value of V1−δ . Taking into account the diplomatic cost of blocking a report K
b(L),
D will block the report if and only if the legal controversy over the report exceeds the threshold
level (L > L¯). Therefore, ex ante the probability that a “violation” ruling will be blocked by D
is 1 − F (L¯|1), where F (L|1) is the cumulative distribution function associated with f(L|1). This
probability is indicated by the solid shaded area under f(L|1) for the GATT procedure in Figure 2.
On the other hand, C has no incentive to exercise his blocking power given a “no violation” ruling,
regardless of the quality of the report, because no economic benefits will accrue (no changes in D’s
trade practices will follow the blocking) but the blocking cost is non-negative. Therefore, ex ante
the probability that a “no violation” ruling will be blocked by C is 0.
Under the WTO with the new appellate procedure, the benefits and costs for disputing parties
to challenge a panel ruling have changed as well. The expected benefit for D to appeal against a
“violation” ruling is V + L δ1−δV , where the first term is the gain in delaying the implementation
for one period during which the appellate process takes place and the second term is the gain that
the “violation” ruling may be reversed with probability L and D can avoid the implementation
completely. The expected benefit of appeal increases if the panel report is subject to a higher
degree of controversy. This relationship is indicated in Figure 2 under the WTO procedure. On the
other hand, when C faces a “no violation” ruling, the expected benefit of appeal is L δ1−δV , which
is the gain that the “no violation” ruling may be reversed with probability L and changes in D’s
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trade measure are required. Since the cost of appeal is assumed to be negligible, both C and D
will always appeal regardless of L. Therefore, ex ante the probability of a ruling being appealed is
1. This is indicated by the solid shaded area under f(L|1) and f(L|0) for the WTO procedure in
Figure 2.
We summarize some observations regarding the disputing parties’ incentives to block (appeal)
panel reports in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (a) There exists asymmetric disadvantage against the complainant under both the
GATT and WTO dispute settlement mechanisms; (b) The disadvantage against the complainant is
diminished under the WTO procedure compared to the GATT procedure, but is not totally eliminated;
(c) The frequency of appeal under the WTO overall should be much higher than the frequency of
panel reports being blocked under the GATT; (d) If the level of legal controversy increases overall,
the frequency of panel reports being blocked under the GATT will increase.
Proof . (a) It is straightforward to see this by comparing the potential benefit and cost for C and
D to block/appeal an adverse ruling under the GATT/WTO. The potential benefit for C to block
or appeal an adverse ruling is uniformly less than D, while the same structure of cost applies to
both parties. (b) The disadvantage against C is smaller under the WTO (V ) than under the GATT
( V1−δ ), but still exists. (c) As indicated in Figure 2, the frequency of appeal under the WTO (= 1) is
higher than the frequency of panel reports being blocked under the GATT (¿ 1).14 (d) An increase
in the overall level of legal controversy can be represented by a rightward shift in the probability
density function, f(L|R) → f ′(L|R), as illustrated in Figure 2. This will lead to an increase in
the frequency of panel reports being blocked under the GATT, as indicated by the dotted shaded
area. Q.E.D.
The data on the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism, as shown in Table 1, indicate
that under the GATT regime, the defendant blocked the report at a higher frequency than the
complainant given an adverse ruling. This may be explained to some extent by the asymmetric
disadvantage against the complainant as claimed above. Table 1 also indicates that the frequency
14The model’s simplifying assumption that the cost of appeal is negligible has led to the strong prediction that all
panel reports under the WTO will be appealed. With some small amount of appellate cost, panel reports will not
always be appealed.
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of appeal under the WTO (70%) is much higher than the frequency of panel reports being blocked
under the GATT (12.5%). Finally, we see in Table 1 that under the GATT regime, there was a surge
in the frequency of blocked panel reports in the 1980s compared to previous decades. This may be
explained by the fact that the panel reports during the 1980s were subject to a higher degree of legal
controversy, which according to Proposition 1 leads to a higher frequency of blocking. As introduced
in Section 2, the Tokyo Round negotiations produced several new “MTN Codes.” These Codes
broadened the GATT’s scope significantly and submitted more contentious and sensitive nontariff
trade measures to international discipline. In general, it would be more difficult to rule on the
legitimacy of a nontariff measure than on a technical tariff measure. Therefore, we would expect
the panel reports to be subject to a higher degree of legal controversy overall in the 1980s following
the Tokyo Round.
The proposition that the disputes invoking “MTN Codes” were more complex in nature and
induced possibly a higher degree of legal controversy over resulting panel reports and a higher
frequency of blocking, can be further supported by the statistics shown in Table 3. In Table 3, we
see that the disputes invoking “MTN Codes” were blocked at a much higher frequency (58%) than
the overall complaints (21%) during the 1980s, confirming that the “MTN Codes” were the major
contributing factor of the increase in blocked cases.
4.2 Consultation Stage
We now proceed to the consultation stage. I first discuss the complainant’s decision to continue or
withdraw from the litigation if the defendant refuses to settle, and to accept or reject a settlement
offer if the defendant proposes to settle. Given the complainant’s strategy of paneling, I then
analyze the defendant’s settlement strategy. Finally, I derive the complainant’s decision of whether
to file the dispute or not, given the defendant’s strategy of settlement. The equilibrium solution is
derived for the GATT regime, although similar analysis can be carried out for the WTO regime.
As illustrated in Figure 1, if C files the complaint, the dispute will end up in one of the three
outcomes: ruled by the panel, withdrawn, or settled. Under the GATT regime, prior to the panel,
C predicts that the panel will give a “violation” ruling with probability pic and that the ruling will
be adopted successfully with probability F (L¯|1). In this case, C will receive the compensation-
equivalent value of V in every period from the beginning of stage 2. C also predicts a probability
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1 − pic of losing the case and receiving nothing. Once the case is filed, C also has to incur the
political cost Kf in every period. Therefore, the expected welfare change in present value for C
from a panel procedure is E∆W pc = picF (L¯|1) δ21−δV − 11−δKf . From D’s perspective, D predicts a
probability pid that C will prevail in the trial and a chance F (L¯|1) that he will not block the ruling.
Therefore, D’s expected welfare change from the panel procedure is E∆W pd = −pidF (L¯|1) δ
2
1−δV. If
the case is withdrawn, C incurs the political cost Kf for the period the case is present. Therefore,
∆Wwc = −Kf . On the other hand, if C withdraws the dispute, D maintains its status quo welfare:
∆Wwd = 0. If the case is settled at the terms S in present value, C receives the settlement amount
but also incurs the political cost Kf for the period the case is present. Therefore, the payoff to C
is ∆W sc = S−Kf . The payoff to D by settling at the terms S, compared to the status quo welfare,
is ∆W sd = −S.
Complainant’s decision to continue or withdraw from the litigation:
If D does not offer to settle, C has to decide whether to continue or withdraw the complaint.
A complainant is indifferent between the two if the expected payoff from the panel E∆W pc equals






f = −Kf ,
⇒ pic = K
f
δF (L¯|1)V ≡ p˜ic. (1)
A complainant with pic ≥ p˜ic expects a higher payoff from the panel proceedings, and therefore will
choose to continue the litigation. On the other hand, a complainant with pic < p˜ic will withdraw
the case. The threshold type p˜ic as defined in (1) is the ratio of the political cost incurred by C
relative to the value of the disputed trade measure, discounted by blocking probability and time
lag in implementation. As p˜ic increases, the dispute is politically more costly, relative to potential
economic benefit, for the complainant to pursue. Therefore, there is less likelihood (1− p˜ic) that the
complainant will proceed to the panel if the defendant refuses to settle. In this sense, the threshold
value p˜ic can be interpreted as an indicator of the degree of power politics at play.
Complainant’s decision to accept or reject a settlement offer:
If D offers to settle at the terms S, C is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the offer
if the expected payoff from the panel proceedings is equal to the payoff from the settlement. The
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threshold level of pic such that E∆W
p






f = S −Kf
⇒ pic = 1− δ
δ2F (L¯|1)V S + p˜ic ≡ pic(S) (2)
A complainant with pic ≥ pic(S) is sufficiently optimistic about the panel ruling, and thus will
continue the litigation. On the other hand, a complainant with pic < pic(S) will opt to accept the
offer S. The threshold type pic(S) is therefore the highest type of C that will agree to settle at the
terms S if offered by the defendant.
Defendant’s settlement strategy:
Taking into account C’s strategy of paneling as characterized by p˜ic and pic(S), D decides on
the settlement offer, given his type pid. Suppose D’s belief about the lowest type of C (C with the
least optimistic prediction about panel rulings) that will file a complaint is pibc. By proposing a
settlement offer S, D expects pic ∈ [pibc, pic(S)] to accept the offer, while pic ∈ [pic(S), 1] to reject the
offer and proceed to the panel stage. Therefore, D’s expected payoff from proposing an offer S is:
E∆Wd(S) = −[pic(S)− pibc]S − [1− pic(S)]S¯d, for max{pibc, p˜ic} ≤ pic(S) ≤ 1 (3)
where S¯d = −E∆W pd is the expected welfare loss from the panel proceedings. The defendant has
no incentive to offer more than enough to settle with all possible types of C such that pic(S) > 1.
For offers S such that pic(S) < max{pibc, p˜ic}, they are equivalent to D’s refusal to settle. To see
this, note that offers S proposed by D such that pic(S) < p˜ic correspond to negative offers, S < 0,
and are equivalent to no settlement. For offers S proposed by D such that pic(S) < pibc, the offers
are not large enough to settle with any type of C that files, so they are equivalent to no settlement
as well. In the case without settlement, the complainant who files (pic ≥ pibc) and who has enough
confidence of winning (pic ≥ p˜ic) continues the litigation. Thus, the defendant’s expected payoff is
E∆Wd(S) = −[1−max{pibc, p˜ic}]S¯d, for pic(S) < max{pibc, p˜ic}.
We are ready to characterize the defendant’s settlement strategy. Suppose Se is the uncon-
strained optimal solution to E∆Wd(S) in (3). Use the first-order condition: ∂E∆Wd∂S = −[∂pic(S)∂S (S−
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1− δ (pid − p˜ic + pi
b
c), (4)
pie ≡ pic(Se) = 12(pid + p˜ic + pi
b
c). (5)
Note from (4) that the defendant’s optimal offer rises as he is more pessimistic about panel judge-
ment (higher pid). The offer also increases if he believes he is facing a potentially stronger opponent
(higher pibc). On the other hand, the defendant’s optimal offer decreases if the dispute is more
costly for the complainant to pursue (higher p˜ic) and there is less likelihood that the complainant
will proceed to the panel if the defendant refuses to settle. As argued in the previous paragraph,
the optimal offer Se is truncated below at pie = max{p˜ic, pibc}, where settlement fails, and above at
pie = 1, where the defendant has no incentives to further increase the settlement offer. It follows
from (5) that a defendant relatively optimistic about panel judgement with pid ∈
[
0, |p˜ic − pibc|
]
will
opt not to settle. On the other hand, a defendant relatively pessimistic with pid ∈
[|p˜ic − pibc|, 1] will
offer to settle following the optimal offer Se. If p˜ic + pibc > 1, the defendant’s settlement scheme pi
e
is truncated above and all types of D with pid ∈ [2− p˜ic − pibc, 1] settle at the upper bound pie = 1,
which corresponds to an offer of Se = δ2F (L¯|1)V (1− p˜ic)/(1− δ).
Complainant’s filing decision and equilibrium outcomes:
Given D’s strategy of settlement as characterized above, C decides whether to file the complaint
or not. C’s filing decision can be conveniently characterized by piec, which is the lowest type of C that
will file a complaint at equilibrium. By perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept, D’s belief should be
consistent with C’s strategy at equilibrium; therefore, the condition pibc = pi
e
c holds at equilibrium.
Given the presence of two-sided asymmetric information, it is likely for a complainant with
pic < p˜ic to file a dispute. These types of C face a probability that D will not settle and as a result
they will have to withdraw the case and incur loss. However, there is some probability that D
might settle. If the prospect of a settlement and the magnitude of the settlement offer are large
enough so that the overall expected payoff from filing is nonnegative, this justifies their decision
to file the complaint. This type of equilibrium corresponds to piec < p˜ic. On the other hand, under
certain parameters, another type of equilibrium piec ≥ p˜ic may arise, where all types of C that
file will proceed to the panel unless a settlement is achieved. Figure 3 illustrates all the possible
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scenarios, where panels “FW1–3” represent three types of equilibria which include the possibility
of withdrawal, and panels “FP1–3” represent three types of equilibria which do not.
In each panel, the type of defendant pid and the type of complainant pic are indicated on the
horizontal and vertical axis, respectively. In scenarios “FW1–3”, the lowest type of C that will
file a complaint is smaller than the threshold type (piec < p˜ic). Following our analysis earlier, the
defendant does not settle if pid ∈ [0, p˜ic − piec], and offers to settle according to the optimal scheme
Se if pid ∈ [p˜ic − piec, 1]. The highest type of C that will accept D’s offer Se is illustrated by the
linear schedule pie. In “FW3”, where p˜ic + piec > 1, the linear schedule pi
e is truncated above and
all types of D with pid ∈ [2 − p˜ic − piec, 1] offers to settle at the upper bound pie = 1. In scenarios
“FP1–3”, the lowest type of C that will file a complaint is larger than the threshold type (piec ≥ p˜ic).
The defendant’s settlement strategy can be similarly illustrated by the linear schedule pie, with the
lower truncation point of not settling for the defendant replaced by pid = piec − p˜ic.
In each type of possible equilibrium, different outcomes emerge depending on the types of the
disputing parties: pic and pid. These are indicated in Figure 3. The possible outcomes are: “nf ”,
where the complainant does not file the case; “w”, where the complainant files and then withdraws
the case; “s”, where the complainant files the case and achieves a settlement with the defendant;
and “p”, where the complainant files the case and the case proceeds to a panel.
Take “FW2” for example. In this equilibrium, a complainant with pic ∈ [0, piec] will not file the
case, while a complainant with pic ∈ [piec, 1] will file the case. If the complainant files the case, a
defendant with pid ∈ [0, p˜ic − piec] will not settle; in response, a complainant with pic ∈ [piec, p˜ic] will
withdraw, while a complainant with pic ∈ [p˜ic, 1] will proceed to a panel. On the other hand, in
response to the complaint, a defendant with pid ∈ [p˜ic − piec, 1] will offer to settle according to the
scheme Se, which a complainant with pic ∈ [piec, pie] will accept and a complainant with pic ∈ [pie, 1]
will reject and proceed to a panel. The size of the region for each outcome measures the likelihood of
each outcome, since the types of the two disputing parties are assumed to be uniformly distributed
on the closed unit intervals [0, 1].
We now characterize the equilibrium. Let E∆W fc (pic) denote the expected payoff from filing a
dispute for a complainant of type pic. Given D’s strategy of settlement, a complainant calculates
its expected payoff from filing the dispute by evaluating the likelihood of each of the three possi-
ble procedural outcomes (withdrawal, settlement, ruling) and their associated payoffs. Note that
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E∆W fc (pic) is a non-decreasing function of pic. The equilibrium lower bound for the type of C that
will file a dispute, piec, is determined by the zero cutoff condition, E∆W
f
c (piec) = 0, for pi
e
c ∈ (0, 1).
If E∆W fc (piec) > 0, lower types of C with pic < pi
e
c will have incentives to file the dispute, which
contradicts the definition of piec. On the other hand, if E∆W
f
c (piec) < 0, the complainant pi
e
c is worse
off by filing the case and will choose not to, which again contradicts the definition of piec. The corner
solutions piec = 0 and pi
e
c = 1 arise respectively if E∆W
f
c (0) ≥ 0 and if E∆W fc (1) ≤ 0.
The following proposition summarizes the dependence of the equilibrium scenario on the pa-
rameters of the dispute. The detailed derivations are provided in the appendix. In addition to the
six equilibrium scenarios illustrated in Figure 3, define “NF” as the equilibrium scenario where the
complainant does not file the dispute, regardless of his type.
Proposition 2 As the relative political cost p˜ic increases for a complainant to pursue a litigation
under the GATT, the equilibria “FP1”, “FW1”, “FW2”, “FW3” (“FP2”), “FP3”, and “NF”
emerge sequentially, if the discount factor δ is relatively large (small).
Proof . As shown in the appendix, the condition on p˜ic for the different scenarios of equilibrium
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2δ ; therefore, “FW3” is not sustainable. Q.E.D.
Figure 4 illustrates the dependence of the equilibrium scenarios on the parameters p˜ic and δ.
The equilibrium “FP1” arises if p˜ic < 0, which corresponds to the situation where the international
political cost by filing the dispute is smaller than the domestic political benefit (Kf < 0) for the
complainant. This is likely the case if the dispute involves a powerful complaining country relative
to the defendant, and/or attracts strong domestic political support from within the complaining
country. The equilibrium “FW1” arises if the relative political cost p˜ic turns positive, and the
equilibrium “FW2” appears next if p˜ic increases further. As the relative political cost continues
rising, the equilibrium “FW3” (“FP2”) emerges, if the discount factor δ is larger (smaller) than
2/3, followed by the equilibrium “FP3”. Eventually with even higher p˜ic, the equilibrium “NF”
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emerges.
Proposition 3 As the relative political cost p˜ic increases for a complainant to pursue a litigation
under the GATT, (a) the incidence of complaints filed (1 − piec) remains constant at first, before
decreases monotonically toward zero; (b) the incidence of complaints withdrawn increases at first,
before decreases toward zero.
Proof . (a) As shown in the appendix, the lowest type of complainants that will file a case is
“FP1”: piec = 0, “FW1”: pi
e
c = 0, “FW2”: pi
e





p˜ic − 1, “FW3”: piec = (1−δ)p˜icδ(1−p˜ic) ,





p˜ic − 1, ‘FP3”: piec = (1−δ)p˜icδ(1−p˜ic) , and “NF”: piec = 1. Thus, the incidence of
complaints filed (1− piec) remains constant from the equilibrium “FP1” to the equilibrium “FW1”,
as p˜ic increases. It is straightforward to show that ∂piec/∂p˜ic > 0 in the other equilibrium scenarios.
Thus, the equilibrium filing threshold piec increases with the rise in the relative political cost p˜ic
through “FW2”, “FW3” (“FP2”), and “FP3”, until it reaches the upper bound piec = 1. The
desired result therefore follows. (b) Recall the formula for the equilibrium filing threshold piec in
each of the equilibrium scenarios from above. The incidence of complaints withdrawn can be
represented by the region “w” in Figure 3. Since in “FW1”, all types of complainants file (piec = 0),
the region “w” increases with the relative political cost p˜ic. It can be shown that ∂(p˜ic−piec)/∂p˜ic < 0
in the rest of equilibrium scenarios. Thus, the incidence of complaints withdrawn decreases as the
relative political cost p˜ic increases in “FW2” and “FW3”, and eventually disappears when p˜ic ≤ piec
as in “FP2” and “FP3”. The desired result follows. Q.E.D.
When the international political cost by filing a dispute is dominated by domestic political
benefit for a complainant as in “FP1”, the expected payoffs from all possible procedural outcomes
are positive. Thus, the complainant will file the dispute regardless of his prediction of panel
judgement (piec = 0). When the relative political cost p˜ic turns positive but is relatively small as in
the scenario “FW1”, it is still sustainable for all types of complainants to file the dispute, and as a
result, the higher the relative political cost p˜ic, the higher the incidence of complaints withdrawn. As
the relative political cost p˜ic continues rising, a complainant not sufficiently optimistic about panel
judgement will quit filing (piec > 0) as in “FW2”. The filing threshold pi
e
c increases monotonically
with the rise in the relative political cost p˜ic and does so at a faster rate. Thus, the incidence
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of complaints withdrawn starts to decrease with the rise in the relative political cost p˜ic. This
continues through “FW3” until the “withdrawal” outcome disappears, as in “FP2” and “FP3”.
With even higher relative political cost, the complainant will not file the dispute regardless of how
optimistic he is about panel judgement (piec = 1), as represented by the scenario “NF”.
Proposition 3 implies that if the population of trade disputes are uniformly distributed across
different pairs of subjective predictions (pic, pid), we should observe some systematic patterns of filing
and withdrawal, corresponding to different levels of relative political cost p˜ic. When the relative
political cost p˜ic is very low, a lot of complaints will be filed but relatively few complaints withdrawn
(“FW1”). When the relative political cost p˜ic is medium, fewer complaints will be filed but a lot of
them withdrawn (“FW2”). When the relative political cost p˜ic is high, even fewer complaints will
be filed and relatively few withdrawn (“FW3”). Finally, when the relative political cost becomes
so high, very few complaints will be filed and none of them withdrawn (“FP3”).
If we look at the statistics for the GATT regime in Table 2, we see that the pattern of total
complaints and cases withdrawn varied across different decades. In the 1950s, 53 trade disputes
were brought under the GATT legal system, ten of which were withdrawn. In the 1960s, the system
basically fell into a void. Merely seven times was the dispute settlement procedure invoked, and
no complaints were withdrawn. In the 1970s, the legal activities seemed to thrive again with 32
new cases filed and five of them withdrawn. This momentum continued into the 1980s when we
witnessed a surge in both litigation (115 complaints) and withdrawals (40 cases).
To understand the data, we can apply the results from Proposition 3 and assign to each decade a
likely level of relative political cost p˜ic that might be experienced on average by all countries utilizing
the GATT dispute settlement system. Judging from the amount of complaints and withdrawn
cases in each decade, the magnitude of relative political cost for each decade, from small to large,
is likely to be: 1980s, 1950s, 1970s, and 1960s. The corresponding representative equilibrium for
these decades is likely to be “FW2”, “FW2/FW3”, “FW3”, and “FP3”, respectively.
As documented by Hudec (1993), the GATT started with a small group of homogeneous coun-
tries. Most of them were small European states which were accustomed to using international
litigation procedure in resolving conflicts. Therefore, the dispute settlement procedure of the 1950s
was dealt with as common practice, with no significant feeling of hostility about it. Therefore, the
international political cost of using the GATT dispute settlement procedure in this decade should
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not have been too high.
In the 1960’s, two major changes occurred to the system: the European Community was es-
tablished, which replaced the original six smaller states with one larger trade negotiating entity;
and the number of developing country members expanded rapidly. Both groups demanded major
exemptions from the GATT obligations and the former advocated a diplomatic approach to all
policy conflicts, contrary to the formal GATT legal procedure. This “anti-legalist” position pre-
vailed among developed countries, including the US, such that it generated an atmosphere in which
formal legal claims were regarded as unfriendly behavior. Therefore, it corresponds to a very high
international political cost in the model for initiating a complaint during this decade.
In the 1970s, the GATT began to rebuild its legal system with the Tokyo Round negotiations.
The U.S. reversed its antilegalist position, and among other countries there was a gradual awakening
of interest in the dispute settlement system. Therefore, we can consider the political cost to have
gradually come down in this decade, to the level of the 1950s, and to have continued to decrease
throughout the 1980s after the Tokyo Round negotiations. The GATT dispute settlement procedure
became a popular device for member countries to resolve trade disputes in this decade. Although
we also witnessed earlier that a higher fraction of panel reports were blocked during this decade,
and therefore the expected benefits from the litigation procedure for a complainant decreased, the
decrease in political costs presumably exceeded the decrease in expected benefits so that overall
the relative political cost p˜ic decreased for a complaint during the 1980s.
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a theoretical model to explain the stylized facts observed for the GATT/WTO
dispute settlement mechanisms. The paper first studies the effect of legal controversy over a panel
ruling on the incentives of countries to block (appeal) a panel report under the GATT (WTO)
procedure. The paper then examines the effect of political power on the incentives of countries to
use, and their interactions in using, the dispute settlement mechanism, in a framework of two-sided
asymmetric information. It is shown that the magnitude of the political cost, relative to potential
benefit that a complainant stands to gain from using this mechanism, determines the pattern of
filing activity and the frequency of various procedural outcomes. This result, when confronted with
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the statistics on disputes in different decades of the GATT regime, provides an indicator of how
well the dispute procedure has worked during various decades, in terms of how much this procedure
has been subject to potential power politics.
Appendix
This appendix derives the equilibrium conditional on the parameters of the dispute. The parameters
of the dispute is summarized by p˜ic and δ. In most of the equilibrium scenarios, the equilibrium
filing threshold piec is derived as a function of the parameters of the dispute. The conditions on the
parameters under which a particular equilibrium scenario arises are then derived.
Equilibrium “FP1”: p˜ic ≤ 0
If p˜ic ≤ 0, it implies that Kf ≤ 0 by (1). This represents a situation where the political benefit
from domestic support by filing a dispute is larger than the international political cost. In this case,
for all pic ∈ [0, 1], E∆W pc ≥ ∆Wwc = −Kf ≥ 0. Therefore, regardless whether D will offer to settle
or not, C’s payoff from all possible procedural outcomes by filing the complaint is nonnegative. In
this case, C will file the complaint regardless of his type pic. This is equivalent to piec = 0.
Equilibrium “FW1”: 0 = piec < p˜ic, E∆W
f
c (0) > 0
This is a scenario with corner solution, where E∆W fc (0) > 0 and C will file the complaint
regardless of his type (piec = 0). However, the political cost of filing is positive. The expected payoff
from filing for pic = 0 is






= p˜ic(−Kf ) +
∫ 1
p˜ic




Use the formula Se in (4) with pibc = 0. It is straightforward to show thatE∆W
f
c (0) = 14
δF (L¯|1)V
1−δ [−4(1−
δ)p˜ic+ δ(1− p˜ic)2]. This is positive if p˜ic < 2−δδ − 2
√
1−δ
δ . Therefore the condition on the parameters





Equilibrium “FW2”: 0 ≤ piec < p˜ic, E∆W fc (piec) = 0, p˜ic + piec < 1
In this scenario, the relative political cost p˜ic is larger, so that some types of complainants will
not file the case. For pic = piec, the expected payoff from filing is
E∆W fc (pi
e




= (p˜ic − piec)(−Kf ) +
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p˜ic−piec




Use the formula Se in (4) with pibc = pi
e
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For this equilibrium to be borne out, the parameters have to satisfy the restrictions 0 ≤ piec < p˜ic









Equilibrium “FW3”: 0 < piec < p˜ic, E∆W
f
c (piec) = 0, p˜ic + pi
e
c ≥ 1
In this scenario, the relative political cost p˜ic is even larger (p˜ic+piec ≥ 1), such that D’s settlement
offer pie is truncated above at pid = 2 − p˜ic − piec. In this case, the expected payoff from filing for
pic = piec is
E∆W fc (pi
e
c) = (p˜ic − piec)∆Wwc +
∫ 2−p˜ic−piec
p˜ic−piec
∆W sc dpid + (p˜ic + pi
e
c − 1)∆W sc |Se=(1−p˜ic) δ2F (L¯|1)V1−δ
= (p˜ic − piec)(−Kf ) +
∫ 2−p˜ic−piec
p˜ic−piec







Se dpid + (p˜ic + piec − 1)(1− p˜ic)
δ2F (L¯|1)V
1− δ .
Use the formula Se in (4) again with pibc = pi
e





δ)p˜ic + δpiec(1− p˜ic)]. This equals zero if piec = (1−δ)p˜icδ(1−p˜ic) . Using this equilibrium’s conditions on piec, we
can derive the corresponding condition on the parameters. It is: 1+δ2δ −
√
1+2δ−3δ2
2δ ≤ p˜ic < 2δ−1δ .
Equilibrium “FP2”: p˜ic ≤ piec, E∆W fc (piec) = 0, p˜ic + piec < 1
This is the scenario where the relative political cost p˜ic is so large that piec < p˜ic is no longer
sustainable. Instead, in the equilibrium, piec ≥ p˜ic, so that if D refuses to settle, all types of C that
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file will proceed to the panel procedure. Note that in this case, the expected payoff from filing for



















(Se −Kf ) dpid.
Use the formula Se in (4) with pibc = pi
e










2δ(1 − p˜ic)piec + δp˜i2c + (2δ − 4)p˜ic + δ]. The zero expected payoff condition for piec implies that





p˜ic − 1. To support this equilibrium such that p˜ic ≤ piec and p˜ic + piec < 1, the




Equilibrium “FP3”: p˜ic ≤ piec, E∆W fc (piec) = 0, p˜ic + piec ≥ 1
In this scenario, the relative political cost is too large to support piec < p˜ic, and is so large that
the defendant’s settlement scheme pie is truncated above at pid = 2 − p˜ic − piec. In this case, the
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We can use the formula of Se in (4) again with pibc = pi
e





p˜ic)piec − (1 − δ)p˜ic]. The condition that E∆W fc (piec) = 0 implies that piec = (1−δ)p˜icδ(1−p˜ic) . Using this






δ } ≤ p˜ic ≤ δ.
Equilibrium “NF”: p˜ic > δ
When p˜ic is larger than δ, it can be shown that the various procedural outcomes will all render C
negative payoffs regardless of his type pic. First of all, note that E∆W
p
c = 0 when pic = p˜icδ . It follows
that if p˜ic > δ, all pic ∈ [0, 1] will have negative expected payoff from the panel procedure. Second,
since p˜ic > δ > 0, the political cost of filing (Kf ) is positive. Therefore, the payoff from filing and
withdrawing a case is negative (∆Wwc = −Kf < 0) for all types of C. Third, even if D is willing to
settle at the upper bound pie = 1, the payoff to C is ∆W sc = S





1−δ (1− p˜icδ ), which is negative if p˜ic > δ. In sum, if C files, the expected payoffs are negative
in all possible outcomes. Therefore, C will not file the complaint regardless of his type pic. This
scenario can be represented as piec = 1.
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Table 1: Incidence of Panel Reports Blocked/Appealed under the GATT/WTO
Regimes Pre-Tokyo Round Post-Tokyo Round WTO
Decades 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1995–2005
Total Rulings 21 5 15 47 105
(No Violation) (6) (0) (7) (7)
(Violation) (15) (5) (8) (40)
(Blocked by C) (0) (0) (0) (2)
(Blocked by D) (1) (0) (0) (8)
Blocked/Appealed 1 0 0 10 74
Percentage of Total Rulings 5% 0% 0% 21% 70%
Note 1: For the GATT era, the data on “Total Rulings” and outcomes of rulings, “No Violation/Violation,” were
compiled from Hudec (1993, p. 289).
Note 2: For the GATT era, the blocked cases were identified from the Database of Hudec (1993) as follows. Cases
with “Procedure” entry of “4” AND “Plenary Action” entry of “1.2”, “1.8”, or “2.3” were first selected
from Database Part II (pp. 588–608). Among them, whose panel reports were actually blocked were then
identified using the information in Database Part I (pp. 417–585). The identified cases are Complaints
42, 103, 105, 107, 113, 132, 137, 149, 185, 191, 196.
Note 3: The DISC case and its three counter-claims (Complaints 69–72, filed in 1973) were not included in the
blocked cases. Their panel rulings were blocked at first but eventually the Council were able to reach
decisions in 1982.
Note 4: The data for the WTO era were taken from Leitner and Lester (2006). The numbers (as of 14 February
2006) excluded circulated panel reports where the deadline for appeal had not expired at the above time.
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Table 2: Procedural Outcomes of Complaints Filed under the GATT and WTO
Regimes Pre-Tokyo Round Post-Tokyo Round WTO
Decades 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1995–2005
Total Complaints 53 7 32 115 335
Cases in Progress 159
Rulings 21(40%) 5(71%) 15(47%) 47 (41%) 95 (54%)
Settled 22(42%) 2(29%) 12(38%) 28 (24%) 52 (30%)
Withdrawn or Abandoned 10(19%) 0 ( 0%) 5 (16%) 40 (35%) 29 (16%)
Note 1: The data were compiled from Hudec (1993, p. 287) and WTO (2005, p. iii) for complaints filed under the
GATT and the WTO regimes, respectively. WTO (2005) registers the number of Panel Reports Adopted
(as of 1 December 2005) instead of Panel Reports Circulated. This contributes to the discrepancy in the
numbers of Rulings between Table 1 and Table 2.
Note 2: The percentages in brackets refer to the frequency of a certain procedural outcome with respect to total
complaints (which are completed).
Table 3: Overall Complaints v.s. Complaints Invoking MTN Codes During the 1980’s
Procedural Outcomes Overall MTN Codes Blocking Incidence Overall MTN Codes
Total Complaints 115 35 Total Rulings 47 12
Rulings 47 (41%) 12 (34%) (No Violation) (7) (2)
Settled 28 (24%) 8 (23%) (Violation) (40) (10)
Withdrawn/Abandoned 40 (35%) 15 (43%) (Blocked by C) (2) (2)
(Blocked by D) (8) (5)
Blocked 10 7
% of Total Rulings 21% 58%
Note 1: The data on “Overall” complaints during the 1980’s were compiled from Hudec (1993) as explained in
the notes to Table 1 and Table 2.
Note 2: The data on “MTN Codes” complaints were identified from the Database Part II (pp. 588-608) of
Hudec (1993) as follows. The cases invoking “MTN Codes” were identified by the column “Legal Provi-
sions”. They are Complaints 97, 99, 103, 105, 106, 109, 111, 114, 115, 121, 123, 126, 128, 130, 134, 136,
137, 142, 147, 149, 151, 158, 159, 164, 165, 185, 188, 190, 191, 192, 196, 197, 203, 204, 205. Their pro-
cedural outcomes were then identified using the following method. Cases with “Procedure” entry of “4”
OR “Plenary Action” entry of “3” were identified as cases with “Rulings”; cases with “Plenary Action”
entry of “1” BUT NOT “Procedure” entry of “4” were identified as cases “Withdrawn/Abandoned”; the
remainder were cases “Settled”. This classification was verified to reach the same aggregate number of
procedural outcomes for overall complaints as reported by Hudec (1993).
Note 3: Blocked cases which invoked “MTN Codes” could be easily identified by comparing the list of blocked
cases (note 2 to Table 1) and the list of “MTN Codes” cases (note 2 above). They are Complaints 103,
105, 137, 149, 185, 191, 196.
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Figure 2: Incentives and Frequencies of Disputing Parties to Block/Appeal a Panel Report
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